Many classical social preference (multiwinner social choice) correspondences are resolute only when two alternatives and an odd number of individuals are considered. Thus, they generally admit several resolute refinements, each of them naturally interpreted as a tie-breaking rule. In this paper we find out conditions which make a social preference (multiwinner social choice) correspondence admit a resolute refinement fulfilling suitable weak versions of the anonymity and neutrality principles, as well as reversal symmetry (immunity to the reversal bias).
Introduction
Consider a committee having h ě 2 members whose purpose is to determine a ranking of n ě 2 alternatives, and assume that committee members are supposed to express their preferences via a ranking of the alternatives. A preference profile is a list of individual preferences, one for each committee member, and a social preference correspondence (spc) is a correspondence from the set of preference profiles to the set of alternatives rankings. Each spc represents then a particular decision process which determines a set of social preferences, whatever individual preferences the committee members express.
In the literature many spcs have been proposed and studied. Most of them satisfy two requirements which are considered strongly desirable by social choice theorists, namely anonymity and neutrality. A spc is said anonymous if the identities of individuals are irrelevant to determine the social outcome, that is, it selects the same social outcome for any pair of preference profiles such that we get one from the other by permuting individual names; neutral if alternatives are equally treated, that is, for every pair of preference profiles such that we get one from the other by permuting alternative names, the social outcomes associated with them coincide up to the considered permutation.
Since in many cases collective decision processes are required to select a unique outcome, an important role in social choice theory is played by resolute spcs, namely those spcs associating a singleton with any preference profile. Unfortunately, classical spcs are not resolute in general. As a consequence, if the members of a committee agree to use a classical spc to aggregate their preferences and a unique outcome is needed, then they also need to find an agreement on which tie-breaking rule to use when two or more rankings are selected by the chosen spc.
The concept of tie-breaking rule can be naturally formalized in terms of refinement of a spc. Let C and C 1 be two spcs. We say that C 1 is a refinement of C if, for every preference profile, the set of social preferences selected by C 1 is a subset of the set of social preferences selected by C. Thus, refinements of C can be thought as methods to reduce the ambiguity in the choice made by C. In particular, resolute refinements of C eliminate any ambiguity as they lead to a unique social outcome, so that they can be identified with the possible tie-breaking rules for C. Of course, if C is not resolute, then it admits more than one resolute refinement. Thus, an interesting issue to address is to understand whether it is possible to find resolute refinements of C which satisfy suitable properties. In particular, since it is immediate to understand that resolute refinements of even anonymous and neutral spcs are not generally anonymous and neutral, one may wonder whether anonymous and neutral resolute refinements of a given spc can be found. Unfortunately, as proved by Bubboloni and Gori (2015, Theorem 7 and Lemma 17) , the existence of an anonymous, neutral and resolute spc is equivalent to the strong arithmetical condition gcdph, n!q " 1 which is rarely satisfied in practical situations. As a consequence, in most cases, given a spc, we cannot get any anonymous and neutral resolute refinement of it.
However, in many concrete cases, individuals in a committee are supposed to differently influence the final decision so that anonymity is an inappropriate requirement to demand. That happens, for instance, for those committees having a president who is more influential than the other committee members. In those cases, it is possible to introduce a relation R on the set H " t1, . . . , hu of individuals describing their reciprocal power relations. For every i, j P H, pi, jq P R if individual i has a decision power which is at least as great as the one of individual j. Once this relation is built, it is natural to focus on those spcs for which the outcomes do not change if individual names are changed via a permutation which is consistent with the relation R, that is, which preserves the power relation among individuals. The spcs satisfying such a property are called R-anonymous; the permutations consistent with R are called automorphisms of R; the set of the automorphisms of R is denoted by AutpRq and is a subgroup of the group of all permutations of H. Of course, if a spc is anonymous, then it is R-anonymous for any possible R so that being anonymous with respect to a relation can be seen as a weakening of the anonymity principle.
Similarly, there are situations where alternatives are differently treated so that neutrality is an inappropriate requirement to demand. Consider, for instance, the case of a committee which evaluates job candidates giving the female candidates an advantage over the male ones. In those cases, we can introduce a relation Q on the set N " t1, . . . , nu of alternatives comparing alternatives on the basis of their exogenous importance in the collective decision. Namely, for every x, y P N , we define px, yq P Q if alternative x has an exogenous importance at least as great as the one of alternative y. Having such a relation, it is natural to consider those spcs for which a change in alternative names has as a unique effect the same change in alternative names in the social outcomes provided that names are changed via a permutation which is consistent with Q, that is, which preserves the relation of exogenous importance among alternatives. The spcs satisfying such a property are called Q-neutral; the permutations consistent with Q are called automorphisms of Q; the set of the automorphisms of Q is denoted by AutpQq and is a subgroup of the group of all permutations of N .
Of course, if a spc is neutral, then it is Q-neutral for any possible Q so that being neutral with respect to a relation can be seen as a weakening of the neutrality principle.
Quite common and important situations are the ones where individuals (alternatives) can be divided into disjoint groups where individuals (alternatives) have the same decision power (exogenous importance) and where such groups can be ranked is such a way that, for every pair of groups, each individual (alternative) belonging to the group having higher rank is more influential (more important) than any individual (alternative) belonging to the other group. For instance, the examples above described (the committee with a president; the committee discriminating on candidates gender) satisfy such a property. In such cases the corresponding relations are orders (i.e. reflexive, complete and transitive relations).
In this paper we propose conditions on R and Q which are necessary and sufficient to make an R-anonymous and Q-neutral spc admit an R-anonymous and Q-neutral resolute refinement. Those conditions are summarized by an arithmetical relation between the size |AutpQq| of the set AutpQq and a special number γpAutpRqq associated with AutpRq (defined in (10)). Namely, given an R-anonymous and Q-neutral spc C (like, for instance, the Borda, the Copeland, the Minimax and the Kemeny spcs which are anonymous and neutral), we have that C admits an R-anonymous and Q-neutral resolute refinement if and only if gcdpγpAutpRqq, |AutpQq|q " 1
(1) (Theorem 17) 1 . The computation of the two numbers γpAutpRqq and |AutpQq| is in general quite hard. However, when the considered relations are orders, things are quite simple.
In fact if R is an order, then γpAutpRqq " gcdpm 1 , . . . , m s q, |AutpRq| "ˆs j"1 pm j !q tj ,
where m 1 ă . . . ă m s is the complete list of the sizes of all the indifference sets of R and, for every j P t1, . . . , su, t j counts the number of indifference sets having size equal to m j (Theorem 22).
We further deepen the analysis of the resolute refinements of a given spc by considering the property of reversal symmetry, a property first introduced by Saari (1994) . Recall that the reversal of a ranking of alternatives is the ranking obtained by making the best alternative the worst, the second best alternative the second worst, and so on, and that a spc is said reversal symmetric if, for any pair of preference profiles such that one is obtained by the other by reversing each individual preference, it associates with one of them a set of social preferences if and only if it associates with the other one the set of their reversal. We prove that the condition gcdpγpAutpRqq, lcmp|AutpQq|, 2qq " 1,
along with other technical conditions, is necessary and sufficient to make any R-anonymous, Qneutral and reversal symmetric spc admit an R-anonymous, Q-neutral and reversal symmetric resolute refinement (Theorem 18). In particular, from that result, it is easily deduced that the Borda and the Copeland spcs admit an R-anonymous, Q-neutral and reversal symmetric resolute refinement if and only if (3) holds true. Of course, the study of the resolute refinements and their properties is meaningful also in other frameworks. For such a reason we follow up on this issue focusing on the framework of the so-called k-multiwinner social choice correspondences (k-sccs), that is, those procedures which associates with any preference profile a family of sets of k alternatives to be interpreted as the family of all the sets of alternatives that can be considered the best k alternatives for the society. This framework, which extends the classical and well-established single winner framework (corresponding to the case k " 1), has been explored for about 30 years and constitutes nowadays an interesting and growing research area. We refer to the recent paper by Elkind et al., 2017 , for many information on that topic. It is worth mentioning that, at least in the single winner case, two special resolute refinements are sometimes used. They are built using two simple methods to break ties. The first method, proposed by Moulin (1988) , is based on a tie-breaking agenda, that is, an exogenously given ranking of the alternatives: in ambiguity case, it is chosen the alternative of the social outcome which is best ranked in the agenda. The second one, is instead based on the preferences of one of the individuals appointed as tie-breaker: in ambiguity case, it is chosen the alternative of the social outcome which is best ranked by the tie-breaker. However, in general, the resolute refinements built through a tie-breaking agenda fail to be neutral while the one built through a tie-breaker fail to be anonymous. Note also that breaking the ties at random assuming a uniform probability distribution over the set of selected alternatives generally generates resolute refinements that are, ex post, neither anonymous nor neutral.
In the above context, given a relation R on the set of individuals and a relation Q on the set of alternatives, we study the problem to determine whether a k-scc admits R-anonymous and Q-neutral resolute refinements 2 and whether some of them are immune to the reversal bias too. Recall that a k-scc is immune to the reversal bias if it never associates the same singleton with a preference profile and its reversal (see Saari and Barney, 2003, and Gori, 2016a) . We prove that if (1) holds true, then any R-anonymous and Q-neutral k-scc admits an R-anonymous and Q-neutral resolute refinement (Theorem 20). Assuming (3), we also find out conditions to make every R-anonymous, Q-neutral and immune to the reversal bias k-scc admit a resolute refinement having the same properties (Theorem 21). Remarkably, that analysis put in evidence the role played by the number k of selected alternatives and the number n of alternatives pointing out that the existence of an immune to the reversal bias resolute refinement is guaranteed when the pair pn, kq belongs to a specific set.
It is worth noting that previous contributions dealing with weak versions of anonymity and neutrality can be found in Gori (2015, 2016b) and Kelly (2011, 2013) . Moreover, formulas in (2) along with the results about sccs above described (Theorem 20 and 21) imply as immediate consequences the main result in Bubboloni and Gori (2016b) , namely Theorem 8 therein.
We finally emphasize that the techniques used in the paper are based on the algebraic approach developed in Bubboloni and Gori (2014 , 2015 , 2016b which mainly relies on the notion of action of a group on a set.
Preliminaries
Throughout the paper, we assume 0 R N and we set N 0 " N Y t0u. Let k P N. We denote by vkw the set t1, . . . , ku. Given a finite set X we denote by |X| its size. A subset of X of size k is called a k-subset of X. We denote by PpXq the set of the subsets of X and by P k pXq the set of the k-subsets of X.
Relations
Let X be a nonempty and finite set. A relation on X is a subset of X 2 . The set of the relations on X is denoted by RpXq. Fix R P RpXq. Given x, y P X, we usually write x ľ R y instead of px, yq P R and x ą R y instead of px, yq P R and py, xq R R. We say that R is complete if, for every x, y P X, x ľ R y or y ľ R x; reflexive if, for every x P X, x ľ R x; irreflexive if, for every x P X, x ń R x; antisymmetric if, for every x, y P X, x ľ R y and y ľ R x imply x " y; asymmetric if, for every x, y P X, x ľ R y implies y ń R x; transitive if, for every x, y, z P X, x ľ R y and y ľ R z imply x ľ R z; acyclic if, for every sequence x 1 , . . . , x s of s ě 2 distinct elements of X such that x i ľ R x i`1 for all i P vs´1w, we have that x s ń R x 1 . It is well-known that if R is transitive and irreflexive (antisymmetric, asymmetric), then R is acyclic. Complete and transitive relations on X are called orders on X. The set of orders on X is denoted by OpXq. Complete, transitive and antisymmetric relations on X are called linear orders on X. The set of linear orders on X is denoted by LpXq.
Let k P N, with 1 ď k ď |X|´1. W P P k pXq is called a k-maximum set of R if, for every x P W and y P XzW , we have x ľ R y. The set of k-maximum sets of R is denoted by M k pRq.
Groups, permutations and relations
Let G be a finite group. Given g P G we denote by |g| the order of g. If U is a subgroup of G, we use the notation U ď G. Given g, v P G and U ď G, the conjugate of g by v is g v " vgv´1 and the conjugate of U by v is the subgroup U v " tg v P G : g P U u. We say that g 1 , g 2 P G are conjugate if there exists v P G such that g 2 " g v 1 . The group constituted only by the neutral element is called the trivial group.
Let n P N. The set of bijective functions from vnw to itself is denoted by S n . S n is a group with product defined, for every σ 1 , σ 2 P S n , by the composition 3 σ 1 σ 2 P S n . The neutral element of S n is given by the identity function on vnw, denoted by id. S n is called the symmetric group on vnw and its elements are called permutations. A permutation σ P S n is usually represented through products of disjoint cycles of lengths greater than or equal to 2. Those cycles are uniquely determined by σ, up to reordering, and are called the constituents of σ. The order reversing permutation in S n is the permutation ρ 0 P S n defined, for every r P vnw, as ρ 0 prq " n´r`1. Obviously, we have |ρ 0 | " 2 and thus Ω " tid, ρ 0 u is a subgroup of S n . Note that ρ 0 has exactly one fixed point when n is odd and no fixed point when n is even. Note also that Ω is an abelian group which admits as unique subgroups tidu and Ω.
Let σ P S n . Given W P Ppvnwq, we denote the image of W through σ by σW (instead of σpW q). Given now W Ď Ppvnwq, we define σW " tσW P Ppvnwq : W P Wu. Note that, for every σ 1 , σ 2 P S n , W P Ppvnwq and W Ď Ppvnwq, pσ 2 σ 1 qW " σ 2 pσ 1 W q and pσ 2 σ 1 qW " σ 2 pσ 1 Wq, so that brackets can be omitted in this type of writings. Given R P Rpvnwq, we set σR " pσpxq, σpyqq P vnw 2 : px, yq P R ( , Rρ 0 " py, xq P vnw 2 : px, yq P R ( , and R id " R. In other words, for every x, y P vnw, x ľ R y if and only if σpxq ľ σR σpyq; x ľ R y if and only if y ľ Rρ0 x. Given Q Ď Rpvnwq and ρ P Ω, we also set σQ " tσR P Rpvnwq : R P Qu, Qρ " tRρ P Rpvnwq : R P Qu.
Note that, for every σ 1 , σ 2 P S n , ρ 1 , ρ 2 P Ω, R P Rpvnwq and Q Ď Rpvnwq, we have that pσ 2 σ 1 qR " σ 2 pσ 1 Rq, Rpρ 1 ρ 2 q " pRρ 1 qρ 2 , pσ 1 Rqρ 1 " σ 1 pRρ 1 q and pσ 2 σ 1 qQ " σ 2 pσ 1 Qq, Qpρ 1 ρ 2 q " pQρ 1 qρ 2 , pσ 1 Qqρ 1 " σ 1 pQρ 1 q. Those properties allow to avoid brackets when writing such kinds of products.
Preference relations and preference profiles
From now on, let n P N with n ě 2 be fixed, and let N " vnw be the set of names of alternatives. A preference relation on N is a linear order on N . Let q P LpN q be a preference relation. If x, y P N are alternatives, we interpret the writing x ľ q y by saying that x is at least as good as y (according to q), and the writing x ą q y by saying that x is preferred to y (according to q). Note that, since q is a linear order, x ą q y is equivalent to x ‰ y and x ľ q y.
It is well-known that there exists a unique numbering x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n of the distinct elements in N such that, once set R " tpx i , x i`1 q P N 2 : i P t1, . . . , n´1uu P RpN q, we have q Ě R and q is the only linear order containing R. Thus, we can completely identify q with its subset x 1 ą q x 2 ą q¨¨¨ąq x n . We refer to r as the rank of x r in q. Since the map from vnw to vnw which associates with any r P vnw the alternative x r is a bijection and thus an element of S n , we also have that q is completely identified with such permutation, which we continue to call q. Explicitly, if q is interpreted in S n , then qprq " x r for all r P vnw. In this way, we have established a well-known and remarkable identification of LpN q with S n . Note now that if ψ P S n , then the relations ψq and qρ 0 are the linear orders given by ψpx 1 q ą ψq ψpx 2 q ą ψq¨¨¨ąψq ψpx n q and x n ą qρ0 x n´1 ą qρ0¨¨¨ąqρ0 x 1 . In particular, for every ψ P S n and ρ P Ω, ψq and qρ can be interpreted as products of permutations. As a consequence, thanks to the cancellation law in the group S n , we have that, for every ψ 1 , ψ 2 P S n and ρ 1 , ρ 2 P Ω, ψ 1 q " ψ 2 q implies ψ 1 " ψ 2 and qρ 1 " qρ 2 implies ρ 1 " ρ 2 . Moreover, by elementary properties of the symmetric group, we have that ψLpN qρ " LpN q for all ψ P S n and ρ P Ω.
From now on, let h P N with h ě 2 be fixed, and let H " vhw be the set of names of individuals. A preference profile is an element of LpN q h . The set LpN q h is denoted by P. If p P P and i P H, the i-th component p i of p represents the preferences of individual i.
Let us set now
Then G is a group through component-wise multiplication, that is, defining, for every pϕ 1 , ψ 1 , ρ 1 q P G and pϕ 2 , ψ 2 , ρ 2 q P G, pϕ 1 , ψ 1 , ρ 1 qpϕ 2 , ψ 2 , ρ 2 q " pϕ 1 ϕ 2 , ψ 1 ψ 2 , ρ 1 ρ 2 q. For every pϕ, ψ, ρq P G and p P P, define p pϕ,ψ,ρq P P as the preference profile such that, for every i P H,
Thus, the preference profile p pϕ,ψ,ρq is obtained by p according to the following rules (to be applied in any order): for every i P H, individual i is renamed ϕpiq; for every x P N , alternative x is renamed ψpxq; for every r P vnw, alternatives whose rank is r are moved to rank ρprq.
For further details and examples on these issues the reader is referred to Bubboloni and Gori (2016b, Sec. 2 .2 and 2.3).
Social preference and social choice correspondences
A social preference correspondence (spc) is a correspondence from P to LpN q. The set of the spcs is denoted by C. Thus, if C P C and p P P, then Cppq is a subset of LpN q.
From now, on let k P vn´1w be fixed. A k-multiwinner social choice correspondence (k-scc) is a correspondence from P to P k pN q. The set of the k-sccs is denoted by C k . Thus, if C P C k and p P P, then Cppq is a set of k-subsets of N .
We say that C P C (C P C k ) is decisive if, for every p P P, Cppq ‰ ∅; resolute if, for every p P P, |Cppq| " 1. We say that
Of course, C admits a resolute refinement if and only if C is decisive; C admits a unique resolute refinement if and only if C is resolute.
Let U be a subgroup of G. We say that C P C is U -symmetric if, for every p P P and pϕ, ψ, ρq P U ,
we say that C P C (C P C k ) is U -consistent if, for every p P P and pϕ, ψ, ρq P U ,
Cpp pϕ,ψ,ρ‰ ψCppq if ρ " ρ 0 and |Cppq| " 1.
We stress that the writings in (5), (6) and (7) are meaningful due to the definitions of products between permutations and sets (sets of sets, relations, sets of relations) and their properties described in Section 2.2. The set of U -symmetric spcs is denoted by C˚U ; the set of U -consistent spcs (k-sccs) is denoted by C U (C U k ). Observe that we do not introduce the concept of U -symmetry for k-sccs. Note also that, if
k . Some basic links between the concepts of symmetry and consistency are given by the following proposition whose proof is in Appendix A. Proposition 1. Let U ď G. Then the following facts hold true:
The concepts of symmetry and consistency with respect to a subgroup U of G include some classic requirements for spcs (k-sccs). Indeed, we have that C P C (C P C k ) is anonymous if and only if it is S hˆt iduˆtidu-consistent; C P C (C P C k ) is neutral if and only if it is tiduˆS nˆt idu-consistent; C P C (C P C k ) is immune to the reversal bias if and only if it is tiduˆtiduˆΩ-consistent; C P C is reversal symmetric if and only if it is tiduˆtiduˆΩ-symmetric. Moreover, any combination of the properties above mentioned can be interpreted in terms of U -symmetry or U -consistency where the subgroup U of G is naturally built as described by the next propositions proved in Appendix A. In what follows, given U 1 and U 2 subgroups of G, we write xU 1 , U 2 y to denote the subgroup of G generated by U 1 and U 2 4 .
Note that C P C is anonymous, neutral and reversal symmetric if and only if C is G-symmetric; C P C (C P C k ) is anonymous, neutral and immune to the reversal bias if and only if C is Gconsistent. Classical spcs provide examples of spcs which are G-symmetric or at least S hˆSnˆt idusymmetric. For instance, the Borda and the Copeland spcs are G-symmetric while the Minimax spc is generally only S hˆSnˆt idu-symmetric.
We finally observe that there is a natural way to construct a k-scc starting from a spc. To begin with, note that if q P LpN q, then M k pqq is a singleton whose unique element is the set tqprq : 1 ď r ď ku, that is, the set of alternatives ranked by q in the first k positions. Given C P C, we can then consider the k-scc C k defined, for every p P P, by
k is a refinement of C k . The following proposition, whose proof is in Appendix A, expresses the main basic property of the induced k-scc with respect to symmetry.
In particular, the k-sccs induced by the Borda and the Copeland spc are G-consistent, while the Minimax k-scc is S hˆSnˆt idu-consistent.
Social methods
Let us introduce now a final new concept which will be very important in the sequel. A social method is a function from P to RpN q. The set of social methods is denoted by M. Given R P M, we say that R is acyclic (transitive, complete etc.) if, for every p P P, the relation Rppq is acyclic (transitive, complete etc.) . The spc associated with R, denoted by C R , is defined, for every p P P, by C R ppq " tq P LpN q : Rppq Ď qu.
Note that, by the well-known Szpilrajn's extension theorem, C R is decisive if and only if R is acyclic. Given U ď G, we say that R is U -symmetric if, for every p P P and pϕ, ψ, ρq P U ,
The set of U -symmetric social methods is denoted by M˚U . Note that if U 1 ď U and R is Usymmetric, then R is also U 1 -symmetric. Moreover, as proved in Appendix A, the next propositions hold true.
Main results
Given a spc or a k-scc, our main purpose is to find a resolute refinement of it satisfying suitable symmetry and consistency properties. More precisely, we are going to address the next three problems.
• Given C P C and U ď G, can we find a resolute refinement of C which is U -symmetric?
• Given C P C and U ď G, can we find a resolute refinement of C which is U -consistent?
• Given C P C k and U ď G, can we find a resolute refinement of C which is U -consistent?
For each of the above questions, we provide conditions on C and U which allow to give an affirmative answer. In order to describe our main results, we need to recall the crucial concept of regular subgroup of G, introduced in Bubboloni and Gori (2015) . A subgroup U of G is said to be regular if, for every p P P, there exists ψ˚P S n conjugate to ρ 0 such that
where Stab U ppq " tpϕ, ψ, ρq P U : p pϕ,ψ,ρq " pu. We also recall the fundamental result about those groups proved in Bubboloni and Gori (2015, Theorem 7):
There exists a U -symmetric resolute spc if and only if U is regular.
Thus, if we want to focus on U -symmetric resolute refinements of a given spc, we necessarily have to assume U regular. The next result follows from some technical adjustments of the proof of Theorem 11 in Bubboloni and Gori (2015) . Its proof is proposed in Appendix B.
Theorem 7. Let U be a regular subgroup of G and C be a decisive and U -symmetric spc. Then the three following conditions are equivalent:
(ii) there exists an irreflexive and acyclic U -symmetric social method R such that C R refines C;
(iii) there exists an irreflexive and acyclic social method R such that C R refines C and the following condition is satisfied:
(a) for every p P P, x, y P N and pϕ, ψ, ρ 0 q P Stab U ppq, we have that px, yq P Rppq if and only if pψpyq, ψpxqq P Rppq.
Corollary 8. Let U be a regular subgroup of G with U ď S hˆSnˆt idu and C be a decisive and U -symmetric spc. Then C admits a U -symmetric resolute refinement.
Proof. For every p P P, we have Cppq ‰ ∅. Pick q p P Cppq and define R : P Ñ RpN q setting, for every p P P, Rppq " q p z∆, where ∆ " tpx, xq : x P N u. Then R is an irreflexive and acyclic social method. Moreover, C R ppq " tq P LpN q : q p z∆ Ď qu " tq p u, so that C R refines C. Since paq trivially holds, we have that condition (iii) in Theorem 7 is satisfied. Therefore, by Theorem 7, C admits a U -symmetric resolute refinement.
The concept of regular group works properly even to analyse consistency. Theorems 9 below is proved in Appendix B by widely extending the theory developed in Bubboloni and Gori (2016b) to the framework here considered.
Theorem 9. Let U be a regular subgroup of G and C be a decisive and U -consistent spc. Then C admits a U -consistent resolute refinement.
Theorems 10 below, also proved in Appendix B, is a largely unexpected result. It establishes a deep link between the number n of alternatives and the number k of winners to be selected in order to make each decisive and U -consistent k-scc admit a U -consistent resolute refinement. It points out that there is a substantial difference between spcs and k-sccs with respect to the existence of U -consistent resolute refinements. Indeed, while for spcs such existence is guaranteed for every U -consistent spc C once U is regular (Theorem 9), for k-sccs one has to require the fulfilment of further conditions in addition to the regularity of U . (ii) one of the following conditions is satisfied:
Since condition (a) in Theorem 10 certainly holds when U ď S hˆSnˆt idu, we easily obtain the following useful consequence.
Corollary 11. Let U be a regular subgroup of G, with U ď S hˆSnˆt idu, and C be a decisive and U -consistent k-scc. Then C admits a U -consistent resolute refinement.
Observe, anyway, that condition (a) in Theorem 10 can be satisfied by regular subgroups not included in S hˆSnˆt idu. Consider the group tiduˆtiduˆΩ and note that, for every p P P,
5 . Thus tiduˆtiduˆΩ is regular and, since id is not conjugate to ρ 0 , (a) trivially holds.
We end the section by stating some simple results about the induced k-sccs.
Proposition 12. Let U be a regular subgroup of G, with U ď S hˆSnˆt idu, and C be a decisive and U -consistent spc. Then the induced k-scc C k admits a U -consistent resolute refinement.
Proof. Since U ď S hˆSnˆt idu, we have that C is U -symmetric and thus, by Proposition 4, C k is a decisive U -consistent k-scc. Thus, by Corollary 11, C k admits a U -consistent resolute refinement.
Proposition 13. Let U ď G and C be a decisive spc. If C admits a resolute U -symmetric refinement, then the induced k-scc C k admits a U -consistent resolute refinement.
On the other hand, clearly, f k is resolute and refines C k .
Regular groups
Because of the results presented in Section 5, the importance of the regular subgroups of G is evident. In this section we propose some theorems which provide a way to test whether a subgroup U of G of the type VˆWˆtidu or VˆWˆΩ, with V ď S h and W ď S n , is regular or not. These types of groups are the relevant ones for the applications we have in mind. We start with some preliminary definitions. Let m P N be fixed in this section. Consider σ P S m . For every x P vmw, the σ-orbit of x is given by x xσy " tσ t pxq P vmw : t P Nu. It is well-known that |x xσy | " s where s " mintt P N : σ t pxq " xu. If x is fixed by σ, then x xσy " txu. If instead x is moved by σ and the constituent of σ moving x is the cycle px 1¨¨¨xs q, then x xσy " tx 1 , . . . , x s u. The set Opσq " tx xσy : x P vmwu of the σ-orbits is a partition of vmw, and we denote its size by rpσq. A system of representatives of the σ-orbits is a set tx 1 , . . . , x rpσq u P P rpσq pvmwq such that Opσq " tx xσy 1 , . . . , x xσy rpσq u. Next we recall the well-known number theoretical concept of partition. A partition of m is an unordered vector T " rm 1 , . . . , m r s where r P N, for every j P t1, . . . , ru, m j P N and m " ř r j"1 m j . The numbers m 1 , . . . , m r are called the terms of T . The set of partitions of m is denoted by Π m .
Consider T P Π m and assume that T admits s P N distinct terms, say m 1 ă¨¨¨ă m s , and assume that, for every j P vsw, m j appears t j ě 1 times in T . Then we use the notation T " rm t1 1 , ..., m ts s s (where t j is omitted when it equals 1). We say that rm t1 1 , ..., m ts s s is the normal form of T and that t j is the multiplicity of m j . For instance, r2, 1, 3, 1s P Π 7 has normal form r1 2 , 2, 3s. We recall the well-known surjective function
where tx 1 , . . . , x rpσq u P P rpσq pvmwq is a system of representatives of the σ-orbits. For every σ P S m , T pσq is called the type of σ. Note that the number of terms equal to 1 in T pσq counts the fixed points of σ while the number of terms different from 1 counts the constituents of σ. Moreover, |σ| " lcmpT pσqq. For instance, if σ " p123qp456qp78q P S 9 , then rpσq " 4, the type of σ is T pσq " r1, 2, 3, 3s P Π 9 , |σ| " lcmr1, 2, 3, 3s " 6 and a system of representatives of the σ-orbits is t1, 4, 7, 9u P P 4 pv9wq. The theoretical importance of the concept of type relies on the fact that two permutations are conjugate if and only if they have the same type.
Given U ď S m , we define the type number of U by γpU q " lcmtgcdpT pσqq : σ P U u.
We describe some basic properties of the type number after having introduced some arithmetic notation. Let x, y P N. If x divides y, we write x | y. If π P N is a prime number we denote by
Lemma 14. Let U, V ď S m . Then the following facts hold true.
(ii) γpU q | m.
(iii) If U contains an m-cycle, then γpU q " m. In particular, γpS m q " m.
Proof. piq The set tgcdpT pσqq : σ P U u is included in tgcdpT pσqq : σ P V u and thus the least common multiple of the first divides that of the second. piiq Let σ P U and let T pσq " rm 1 , . . . , m r s. If d " gcdpT pσqq, we have that d | m j for all j P vrw and since ř r j"1 m j " m we have d | m. Thus m is a common multiple for the integers in tgcdpT pσqq : σ P U u, which implies γpU q | m.
piiiq Let σ P U be an m-cycle. Then T pσq " rms and gcdpT pσqq " m. Thus m | γpU q. Since by piiq we also have γpU q | m we conclude that γpU q " m.
Theorem 15. Let V ď S h and W ď S n . Then VˆWˆtidu is regular if and only if gcdpγpV q, |W |q " 1.
Proof. Let U " VˆWˆtidu. Assume first that gcdpγpV q, |W |q " 1. Assume further, by contradiction, that U is not regular. Then, by Theorem 12 in Bubboloni and Gori (2015) , there exist pϕ, ψ, idq P U and a prime π such that |ψ| π ą 1 and |ψ| π | gcdpT pϕqq. Then π | γpV q and π | |W | so that π | gcdpγpV q, |W |q " 1, a contradiction.
Assume next that U is regular. We show that if π is a prime dividing |W |, then π ∤ γpV q. Let π | |W |. Then, by Cauchy Theorem, there exists ψ P W with |ψ| " π. But, for every ϕ P V , we have pϕ, ψ, idq P U and, of course, |ψ| π " π. Thus, by Theorem 12 in Bubboloni and Gori (2015) , we have that, for every ϕ P V , π ∤ gcdpT pϕqq so that π ∤ lcmtgcdpT pϕqq : ϕ P V u " γpV q.
Theorem 16. Let V ď S h and W ď S n . Then VˆWˆΩ is regular if and only if gcdpγpV q, lcmp|W |, 2qq " 1.
Proof. Let U " VˆWˆΩ. Assume first that gcdpγpV q, lcmp|W |, 2qq " 1. Assume further, by contradiction, that U is not regular. Then, by Theorem 12 in Bubboloni and Gori (2015) , there exist pϕ, ψ, idq P U and a prime π such that |ψ| ψ ą 1 and |ψ| ψ | gcdpT pϕqq, or there exist pϕ, ψ, ρ 0 q P U , with ψ 2 " id and ψ not conjugate of ρ 0 , such that 2 | gcdpT pϕqq. In the first case we have π | |W | as well as π | γpV q and thus π | gcdpγpV q, lcmp|W |, 2qq " 1, a contradiction. In the second case we have 2 | γpV q, which implies the contradiction 2 | gcdpγpV q, lcmp|W |, 2qq " 1.
Assume next that U is regular. We show first that if π is a prime dividing |W |, then π ∤ γpV q. Let π | |W |. Then, by Cauchy Theorem, there exists ψ P W with |ψ| " π. But, for every ϕ P V , we have pϕ, ψ, idq P U and, of course, |ψ| π " π. Thus, by Theorem 12 in Bubboloni and Gori (2015) , we get π ∤ gcdpT pϕqq and so also π ∤ lcmtgcdpT pϕqq : ϕ P V u " γpV q. We are then left with proving that 2 ∤ γpV q, that is, that 2 ∤ gcdpT pϕqq for all ϕ P V . Let ϕ P V and consider pϕ, id, ρ 0 q P U. Since id 2 " id but id is not a conjugate of ρ 0 , by Theorem 12 in Bubboloni and Gori (2015) , we get 2 ∤ gcdpT pϕqq.
Generalized anonymity and neutrality
A variety of subgroups of the type VˆWˆtidu or VˆWˆΩ naturally arise from considering weak versions of anonymity and neutrality. To explain that we introduce the group of automorphisms of a relation and illustrate some of its properties.
Let m P N and R P Rpvmwq. The set of automorphisms of R is defined by
AutpRq " tσ P S m : @x, y P vmw, σpxq ľ R σpyq if and only if x ľ R yu.
In other words, σ P AutpRq if and only if σR " R. AutpRq is a subgroup of S m , because it is immediate to check that id P AutpRq and that if σ, τ P AutpRq, then στ P AutpRq. For our scopes it is important to note that AutpRq is often equal to tidu. We will see in the next section that this happens when R P Lpvmwq. Moreover, as a consequence of a graph theoretical result by Erdös and Rényi (1963) , almost all relations have trivial automorphism group, that is, the proportion of the relations on vmw which have a trivial automorphism group tends to 1 as m goes to`8. On the other hand, there surely exist relations having the maximum possible automorphism group. Indeed, for the total relation R " vmw 2 , we have AutpRq " S m . Consider now R P RpHq and Q P RpN q. For every i, j P H, we assume that i ľ R j means that individual i has a decision power which is at least as great as the one of individual j; for every x, y P N , we assume that x ľ Q y means that alternative x has an exogenous importance which is at least as great as the one of alternative y. In other words, R and Q are interpreted as a description of power relations among individuals and alternatives, respectively.
Given C P C (C P C k ), we say that C is R-anonymous if C is AutpRqˆtiduˆtidu-consistent; Q-neutral if C is tiduˆAutpQqˆtidu-consistent. Thus, C is R-anonymous if permuting individual names has no effect on the final outcome, provided that the power relation among individuals is maintained; C is Q-neutral if the unique effect of permuting alternative names is that alternative names are accordingly permuted in the final outcome, provided that the power relation among alternatives is maintained. Note that, since Autpvhw 2 q " S h and Autpvnw 2 q " S n , the concepts of vhw 2 -anonymity and vnw 2 -neutrality correspond to the classical concepts of anonymity and neutrality, respectively. Note also that if AutpRq " tidu, then every C P C (C P C k ) is R-anonymous; if AutpQq " tidu, then every C P C (C P C k ) is Q-neutral.
We also stress that, by Propositions 2 and 3, C P C (C P C k q is R-anonymous and Q-neutral if and only if C is AutpRqˆAutpQqˆtidu-consistent; C P C is R-anonymous, Q-neutral and reversal symmetric if and only if C is AutpRqˆAutpQqˆΩ-symmetric; C P C (C P C k q is R-anonymous, Q-neutral and immune to the reversal bias if and only if C is AutpRqˆAutpQqˆΩ-consistent.
Below we provide some simple but very important consequences of the theory developed in the previous sections.
Theorem 17. Let R P RpHq, Q P RpN q and C be a decisive, R-anonymous and Q-neutral spc.
Then the two following conditions are equivalent:
(i) C admits an R-anonymous and Q-neutral resolute refinement;
(ii) gcdpγpAutpRqq, |AutpQq|q " 1.
Proof. piq ñ piiq. Assume that (i) holds true. Then by (9), we have that the group AutpRqÂ utpQqˆtidu is regular, so that, by Theorem 15, gcdpγpAutpRqq, |AutpQq|q " 1. piiq ñ piq. Assume that (ii) holds true. Then, by Theorem 15, the group AutpRqˆAutpQqˆtidu is regular. Then we can apply Theorem 9.
Note that condition gcdpγpAutpRqq, |AutpQq|q " 1 above is trivially satisfied if one between AutpRq and AutpQq is trivial. Observe also that the above theorem generalizes the classic result about the existence of a resolute anonymous and neutral spc. Namely, taking R " H 2 , Q " N 2 and using Lemma 14(iii), we immediately have that there exists a resolute, anonymous and neutral spc if and only if gcdph, n!q " 1.
Theorem 18. Let R P RpHq and Q P RpN q and C be a decisive, R-anonymous, Q-neutral and reversal symmetric spc. Then the two following conditions are equivalent:
(i) C admits an R-anonymous, Q-neutral and reversal symmetric resolute refinement;
(ii) gcdpγpAutpRqq, lcmp|AutpQq|, 2qq " 1 and there exists an irreflexive acyclic social method R such that C R refines C and, for U " AutpRqˆAutpQqˆΩ, the following condition is satisfied:
Proof. piq ñ piiq. Assume that (i) holds true. Then by (9), we have that the group U is regular, so that, by Theorem 16, gcdpγpAutpRqq, lcmp|AutpQq|, 2qq " 1. Moreover, using now Theorem 7 we conclude the proof. piiq ñ piq. Assume that (ii) holds true. Then, by Theorem 16, we know that the group U is regular. Therefore we can apply Theorem 7.
Theorem 19. Let R P RpHq and Q P RpN q and C be a decisive, R-anonymous, Q-neutral and immune to the reversal bias spc. If gcdpγpAutpRqq, lcmp|AutpQq|, 2qq " 1, then C admits an Ranonymous, Q-neutral and immune to the reversal bias resolute refinement.
Proof. By Theorem 16, the group U " AutpRqˆAutpQqˆΩ is regular. Then Theorem 9 applies.
Theorem 20. Let R P RpHq and Q P RpN q and C be a decisive, R-anonymous and Q-neutral k-scc. If gcdpγpAutpRqq, |AutpQq|q " 1, then C admits an R-anonymous and Q-neutral resolute refinement.
Proof. Apply Theorem 15 and Corollary 11.
Theorem 21. Let R P RpHq and Q P RpN q and assume that gcdpγpAutpRqq, lcmp|AutpQq|, 2qq " 1. Then the two following facts are equivalent: (i) every decisive, R-anonymous, Q-neutral and immune to the reversal bias k-scc admits an R-anonymous, Q-neutral and immune to the reversal bias resolute refinement;
(ii) one of the following conditions is satisfied:
Proof. Apply Theorem 16 and Theorem 10.
Orders
Orders on the set of individuals (alternatives) model those situations in which it is reasonable to divide individuals (alternatives) into disjoint groups where all individuals (alternatives) have the same decision power (exogenous importance) and to rank such groups. Consider, for instance, a faculty committee composed by full and associate professors which is going to select some applicants for an academic position. There are in this case two well distinguished groups in the committee and a natural hierarchy between them ranking first the full professors and second the associate professors. Since those type of situations are definitely very natural and usual in practical situations, orders turn out to be a family of relations which is very important for our purposes and which deserves to be carefully analysed. In this section we characterize the group of automorphism of orders and present some consequences of such a characterization. Let us introduce first some preliminary notation. Given R P Opvmwq, we know that the relation
IpRq " tpx, yq P vmw 2 : px, yq P R and py, xq P Ru is an equivalence relation. The equivalence classes of IpRq are called the indifferent sets of R and give a partition of the set vmw. We denote then by T R the partition of m obtained considering the list of the sizes of the indifference sets of R. For instance, if m " 11 and
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 then T R " r1, 2 2 , 3 2 s. Note that R P Lpvmwq if and only if T R " r1 m s.
The group of automorphisms of an order
Given R P Opvmwq, the information encoded in T R is enough to fully determine the group AutpRq as shown by the following important result. Indeed, as an immediate consequence of it, if R, R 1 P Opvmwq satisfy T R " T R 1 , then AutpRq » AutpR 1 q.
Theorem 22. Let R P Opvmwq and T R " rm 
In particular, γpAutpRqq " gcd pm 1 , . . . , m s q (12) and |AutpRq| "
Proof. Let us first prove (11). Since T R " rm t1 1 , . . . , m ts s s, for every j P vsw, there are t j equivalence classes of IpRq of size m j and that ř s j"1 m j t j " m. Of course, the total amount of the equivalence classes of IpRq is t " ř s j"1 t j . We can find then x 1 , . . . , x t P vmw such that the set of the equivalence classes of IpRq is trx 1 s IpRq , . . . , rx t s IpRq u and such that, for every x P rx i s IpRq and y P rx i 1 s IpRq with i ă i 1 , we have x ą R y.
Consider the permutations of S m which maps each equivalence class of IpRq in itself. Those permutations clearly form a subgroup U of S m isomorphic toˆs j"1 S tj mj . Moreover, they belong to AutpRq. Indeed, let σ P U and assume that for some x, y P vmw we have x ľ R y. If y ľ R x, then x and y belong to the same equivalence class of IpRq, then also σpxq and σpyq belong to that class and thus σpxq ľ R σpyq. If y ń R x, then x ą R y and x and y belong to different equivalence classes of IpRq. Then we must have x P rx i s IpRq and y P rx i 1 s IpRq for some i, i 1 P vtw with i ă i 1 . Thus, we have σpxq P σprx i s IpR" rx i s IpRq and σpyq P σprx i 1 s IpR" rx i 1 s IpRq so that, σpxq ą R σpyq and then, in particular, σpxq ľ R σpyq. On the other hand, if σpxq ľ R σpyq, then the same argument applies to σ´1, giving x ľ R y. We have therefore shown that AutpRq ě U »ˆs j"1 S tj mj . Pick now σ P AutpRq. If, for some x, y P vmw, we have rxs IpRq " rys IpRq , then we must also have rσpxqs IpRq " rσpyqs IpRq . In other words, we necessarily have σprx i sq " rx i s for all i P vtw. Thus AutpRq ď U and (11) holds.
Let us now prove (12). Consider σ P AutpRq. By (11), we have that the partition T pσq of m induces a partition of m j for all j P vsw. It follows that, for every j P vsw, gcdpT pσqq | m j and thus gcdpT pσqq | gcd pm 1 , . . . , m s q. Consider now d P N and assume that, for every σ P AutpRq, gcdpT pσqq | d. Observe that, for every j P vsw, the group S tj mj contains a permutation σ j which is the product of t j disjoint m j -cycles and so, by (11), AutpRq contains σ " σ 1¨¨¨σs . Since T pσq " rm (12) is proved. Finally note that by (11), we immediately get (13).
Corollary 23. Let R P Opvmwq. Then AutpRq » tidu if and only if R P Lpvmwq.
Proof. By Theorem 22, AutpRq is trivial if and only if the only term appearing in T R is 1, that is if and only if T R " r1
m s, which is equivalent to R P Lpvmwq.
By the above corollary the automorphism group of an order can be very poor. On the other hand, there exist orders having a very large automorphism group. Apart the trivial case of the order R " vmw 2 having AutpRq " S m , there are indeed relevant examples of orders whose automorphism group a maximal subgroup. Recall that a subgroup Y of a group X, with 1 ‰ Y ‰ X, is called maximal if the only subgroup of X properly containing Y is X itself.
Corollary 24. Let R P Opvmwq, with T R " rm 1 , m 2 s and m 1 ‰ m 2 . Then AutpRq » S m1ˆSm2 is maximal in S m .
Proof. By Theorem 22, we have that AutpRq » S m1ˆSm2 and it is a well-known result in group theory, that for m 1 ‰ m 2 , S m1ˆSm2 is maximal in S m (see, for instance, Liebeck et al., 1987, p. 366) .
Applications
The case discussed in the next proposition is significant because there are plenty of examples of orders for which the greatest common divisor of the sizes of the indifference sets is 1.
Proposition 25. Let R P OpHq and Q P OpN q. Assume that T R " rh t1 1 , . . . , h tu u s with gcdph 1 , . . . , h u q " 1. Then every decisive, R-anonymous and Q-neutral spc pk-sccq admits an R-anonymous and Qneutral resolute refinement.
Proof. Since gcdph 1 , . . . , h u q " 1, Theorem 22 implies that γpAutpRqq " 1. It follows that gcdpγpAutpRqq, |AutpQq|q " 1. We conclude then applying Theorems 17 and 20.
As an application of Proposition 25, consider a committee H having a president, say individual 1, and assume that the president has a decision power which is greater than the one of all the other members of the committee. Assume further that all individuals but the president have the same decision power. Such a situation can be modelled by the order R P OpHq defined by R " tp1, yq P H 2 : y P Hu Y tpx, yq P H 2 : x, y P Hzt1uu.
In this case, we have T R " r1, h´1s, so that trivially gcdp1, h´1q " 1. Thus, whatever Q P OpN q is, applying Proposition 25 we obtain that every decisive, R-anonymous and Q-neutral k-scc C admits a resolute refinement sharing the same symmetry properties . If k " 1, among those resolute refinements there is the one obtained by letting the president breaking the ties for a profile p such that |Cppq| ě 2, by choosing his best alternative among those belonging to Cppq. Note that this is exactly the classic tie-breaker method widely used in practical situations. Anyway this is is not the only possibility. Another choice consistent with the symmetry principles could be given by the president choosing his worst alternative among those belonging to Cppq. Note that if k ě 2, then there is no standard way to let the president decide. Anyway our results ensure that an R-anonymous and Q-neutral resolute refinement exists. Next consider a planner who wants to organise a committee made up of h members to judge some candidates applying for k job positions, using some well-established k-scc C. If C is not resolute, the planner reasonably desires to dispose of a resolute refinement of C in order to produce an actual decision. Preserving neutrality, he can get that goal by renouncing the full anonymity in the collective decision. To that purpose he can simply fix two numbers h 1 and h 2 with gcdph 1 , h 2 q " 1 and h 1`h2 " h, split the committee into two subcommittees H 1 and H 2 with |H 1 | " h 1 and |H 2 | " h 2 , and let the decision power relation among the committee members be described by a suitable R P OpHq with indifference sets H 1 and H 2 .
Let φ denote the Euler totient function. The set A " trh 1 , h 2 s P Π h : gcdph 1 , h 2 q " 1u contains one element if and only if h P t2, 3, 4, 6u and two elements when h " 5. Moreover, A contains φphq 2 ě ? h 2 ě 2 elements if h ě 7. Hence, the planner can generally choose the most suitable partition rh 1 , h 2 s among many. For instance, if h " 7, he can choose rh 1 , h 2 s among r1, 6s, r2, 5s and r3, 4s; if h " 8, he can choose rh 1 , h 2 s between r1, 7s and r3, 5s. Note that those choices work whatever the number n of candidates could be. Knowing the number n of candidates can lead to other possibilities. For instance, if h " 7 and n " 4, we have gcdph, n!q " 1 and thus the planner is not obliged to split the committee to reach the goal. In that case he can reach full anonymity.
Appendix

A Symmetry and consistency
First of all, let us note that, for every σ P S n , ρ P Ω, W 1 , W 2 P PpN q, W 1 , W 2 Ď PpN q, R 1 , R 2 P RpN q and Q 1 , Q 2 Ď RpN q, we have that
From those inclusions, analogous relations for equalities hold true. We freely use those properties in the rest of the paper. We emphasize their use when particularly remarkable. Let U ď G. In Bubboloni and Gori (2015, Proposition 2) it is shown that the definition (4), determines an action of U on the set of preference profiles. In particular, for every p P P and pϕ 1 , ψ 1 , ρ 1 q, pϕ 2 , ψ 2 , ρ 2 q P U , we have p pϕ1ϕ2,ψ1ψ2,ρ1ρ2q " pp pϕ2,ψ2,ρ2pϕ1,ψ1,ρ1q .
The above equality is a main tool throughout the paper. To begin with it allows to prove the basic results on symmetry and consistency stated in Section 4.
Proof of Proposition 1. piq Let C P C˚U and p P P. Consider first pϕ, ψ, idq P U . Since C is Usymmetric, then Cpp pϕ,ψ,id" ψCppqid " ψCppq and (6) is satisfied. In order to prove (7) assume, by contradiction, that |Cppq| " 1 and that there exists pϕ, ψ, ρ 0 q P G such that Cpp pϕ,ψ,ρ0" ψCppq. Then Cppq " tqu for some q P LpN q and, by the U -symmetry of C, we get ψCppqρ 0 " ψCppq. Thus, Cppqρ 0 " Cppq, that is, qρ 0 " q, which gives the contradiction ρ 0 " id.
piiq From (i) we know that C˚U Ď C U . On the other hand if C P C U we have that condition (6) is satisfied and, since U ď S hˆSnˆt idu, that equals condition (5) so that C P C˚U .
Proof of Proposition 2.
The fact that C xU1,U2y Ď C˚U 1 X C˚U 2 is obvious. We show the other inclusion. Let C P C˚U 1 X C˚U 2 . Consider the set W " tpϕ, ψ, ρq P G : @p P P, Cpp pϕ,ψ,ρ" ψCppqρu.
We show that W is a subgroup of G. Let pϕ 1 , ψ 1 , ρ 1 q, pϕ 2 , ψ 2 , ρ 2 q P W and we show that pϕ 1 ϕ 2 , ψ 1 ψ 2 , ρ 1 ρ 2 q P W. Given p P P, by (15) and recalling that Ω is abelian, we have Cpp pϕ1ϕ2,ψ1ψ2,ρ1ρ2" C´pp pϕ2,ψ2,ρ2pϕ1,ψ1,ρ1q¯" ψ 1 Cpp pϕ2,ψ2,ρ2q qρ 1 "
Since W is a group and contains both U 1 and U 2 , then we necessarily have W ě xU 1 , U 2 y. But , by definition of W , C P C˚W and thus also C P C˚x U1,U2y .
Proof of Proposition 3.
The proof is formally the same of Proposition 10 in Bubboloni and Gori (2016b) , simply taking into account (14).
A detailed proof of the above result is proposed in Appendix C.1.
Proof of Proposition 4. Let C P C˚U and p P P. Consider at first pϕ, ψ, idq P U . Since C is U -symmetric then Cpp pϕ,ψ,id" ψCppq, that is, Cpp pϕ,ψ,id" tψq P LpN q : q P Cppqu. Then C k pp pϕ,ψ,id" tM k pψqq P P k pN q : q P Cppqu " tψM k pqq P P k pN q : q P Cppqu " ψtM k pqq P P k pN q : q P Cppqu " ψC k ppq, so that C k satisfies (6). In order to show that C k satisfies (7) too, assume by contradiction that |C k ppq| " 1 and that there exists pϕ, ψ, ρ 0 q P G such that C k pp pϕ,ψ,ρ0" ψC k ppq. Then there are k distinct elements x 1 , . . . , x k of N such that C k ppq " ttx 1 , . . . , x k uu and C k pp pϕ,ψ,ρ0" ttψpx 1 q, . . . , ψpx k quu.
In particular, for every q P Cppq, we have tqp1q, . . . , qpkqu " tx 1 , . . . , x k u. By the U -symmetry of C, we have Cpp pϕ,ψ,ρ0" ψCppqρ 0 and thus C k pp pϕ,ψ,ρ0" ttq 1 p1q, . . . , q 1 pkqu P P k pN q : q 1 P ψCppqρ 0 u.
Now if q 1 P ψCppqρ 0 there exists q P Cppq such that q 1 " ψqρ 0 and therefore q 1 p1q " ψqρ 0 p1q " ψqpnq. Since n ą k and q is a bijection we have that qpnq R tqp1q, . . . , qpkqu " tx 1 , . . . , x k u. Thus, since also ψ is a bijection, we also have q 1 p1q " ψqpnq R tψpx 1 q, . . . , ψpx k qu. It follows that no element of C k pp pϕ,ψ,ρ0can coincide with tψpx 1 q, . . . , ψpx k qu, against (16).
Proof of Proposition 5.
We show that, for every p P P and pϕ, ψ, ρq P U , C R pp pϕ,ψ,ρ" ψC R ppqρ. Fix p P P and pϕ, ψ, ρq P U and prove first that ψC R ppqρ Ď C R pp pϕ,ψ,ρq q. Pick q P C R ppq and show that ψqρ P C R pp pϕ,ψ,ρq q. We have q Ě Rppq, which implies ψqρ Ě ψRppqρ. Since R is U -symmetric, we then have ψqρ Ě Rpp pϕ,ψ,ρand therefore ψqρ P C R pp pϕ,ψ,ρq q. Let us prove now the other inclusion C R pp pϕ,ψ,ρĎ ψC R ppqρ. Let p " p pϕ,ψ,ρq and note that p " p pϕ´1,ψ´1,ρq . Observe that, since U is a group and pϕ, ψ, ρq P U also its inverse pϕ, ψ, ρq´1 " pϕ´1, ψ´1, ρq P U. Thus, by the inclusion just proved, we get ψ´1C
R pp pϕ,ψ,ρq qρ Ď C R ppq and we conclude applying ψ on the left and ρ on the right to both sides of that inclusion.
Proof of Proposition 6.
Repeat word by word the proof of Proposition 2 writing M instead of C and R instead of C.
B Proof of Theorems 7, 9 and 10
The proofs of Theorems 7, 9 and 10 are definitely technical and require some preliminary work. We underline that the results we are going to prove are more general as they provide a method to potentially build and count all the resolute refinements.
B.1 The role of the orbit representatives
Let U ď G and p P P. The set p U " tp g P P : g P U u is called the U -orbit of p and Stab U ppq " tg P U : p g " pu ď U is called the stabilizer of p in U . Recall that, for every g P U , we have Stab U pp g q " Stab U ppq g . The set P U " tp U : p P Pu of the U -orbits is a partition of P. We use P U as set of indexes and denote its elements with j. A vector pp j q jPP U Pˆj PP U P is called a system of representatives of the U -orbits if, for every j P P U , p j P j. The set of the systems of representatives of the U -orbits is denoted by SpU q. If pp j q jPP U P SpU q, then, for every p P P, there exist j P P U and pϕ, ψ, ρq P U such that p " p j pϕ,ψ,ρq . Note that if p j1 pϕ1,ψ1,ρ1q " p j2 pϕ2,ψ2,ρ2q for some j 1 , j 2 P P U and some pϕ 1 , ψ 1 , ρ 1 q, pϕ 2 , ψ 2 , ρ 2 q P U , then j 1 " j 2 and, by (15), pϕ´1 2 ϕ 1 , ψ´1 2 ψ 1 , ρ´1 2 ρ 1 q P Stab U pp j1 q.
In this section we present some results explaining how a correspondence C P C˚U Y C U Y C U k is determined by the values it assumes on a system of representatives of the U -orbits in P. To that purpose, the first step is to split P U into two parts P U 1 and P U 2 , where
Note that those sets are well defined because U X pS hˆSnˆt iduq is normal in U . Moreover P
In particular, P U 1 and P U 2 cannot be both empty. Obviously, if U ď S hˆSnˆt idu, then P U 2 " ∅ and P U " P U 1 ‰ ∅. We recall a part of Proposition 24 in Bubboloni and Gori (2016b) which is interesting for our scope 7 : P U 2 ‰ ∅ if and only if there exists pϕ, ψ, ρ 0 q P U such that ψ is a conjugate of ρ 0 .
Proposition 26. Let U ď G and C, C 1 P C˚U . Assume that there exists pp j q jPP U P SpU q such that, for every j P P U , Cpp
Proof. Let p P P and show that Cppq " C 1 ppq. We know there exist j P P U and pϕ, ψ, ρq P U such that p " p j pϕ,ψ,ρq . Then, Cppq " Cpp j pϕ,ψ,ρ" ψCpp j qρ " ψC 1 pp j qρ " C 1 pp j pϕ,ψ,ρ" C 1 ppq.
The proof of the above result is the same as the one of Proposition 12 in Bubboloni and Gori (2016b) . A detailed proof of the above result is proposed in Appendix C.2.
Assume that there exist pp j q jPP U P SpU q and pϕ˚, ψ˚, ρ 0 q P U such that Cpp j q " C 1 pp j q for all j P P U and Cpp j pϕ˚,ψ˚,ρ0" C 1 pp j pϕ˚,ψ˚,ρ0for all
The proof of the above result is formally the same as the one of Proposition 13 in Bubboloni and Gori (2016b) . A detailed proof of the above result is proposed in Appendix C.3.
B.2 Resolute spcs and k-sccs
We have defined C P C (C P C k ) resolute if, for every p P P, |Cppq| " 1. We now denote by F (F k ) the set of resolute spc (k-scc). Obviously, we have F Ď C and F k Ď C k and, for every U ď G, we can consider the following sets
They describe, respectively, the set of the U -symmetric resolute spc, the set of the U -consistent resolute spc, the set of the U -consistent resolute k-scc. Given C P F, for every p P P, there exists a unique q P LpN q such that Cppq " tqu. Thus C can be naturally identified with the social preference function (spf) f from P to LpN q defined, for every p P P, by f ppq " q. Similarly, given C P F k , for every p P P, there exists a unique W P P k pN q such that Cppq " tW u. Thus C can be naturally identified with the k-multiwinner social choice function (k-scf) f from P to P k pN q defined, for every p P P, by f ppq " W. We will freely adopt those identifications and the language of functions in what follows. For that reason we will refer to F˚U also as the set of the U -symmetric spfs; to F U also as the set of the U -consistent spfs; to F U k also as the set of the U -consistent k-scfs. Let C P C (C P C k ). Denote the refinements of C by C C (C k,C ). Then the resolute refinements of C are the functions in the set
7 Further details can be found in Section 5.2 of Bubboloni and Gori (2016b) .
Let now U ď G. Given C P C, we consider the following sets
They describe, respectively, the set of the U -symmetric spfs which are refinements of C and the set of the U -consistent spfs which are refinements of C. Given C P C k , we finally consider the set
describing the set of U -consistent k-scfs which are refinements of C.
B.3 Proof of Theorem 7
In order to approach the proof of Theorem 7 we need some preliminary facts. Let U ď G and S P C be defined, for every p P P, by Sppq " q P LpN q : @pϕ, ψ, ρq P Stab U ppq, ψqρ " q ( . (ii) S P C˚U .
Proof. piq Let U be regular. Proving (9), in Bubboloni and Gori (2015) , the authors showed that
where C Sn pρ 0 q denotes the centralizer of ρ 0 in S n and u P S n is such that ψ˚" uρ 0 u´1, with ψ˚P S n the permutation appearing in the definition (8) of regularity. In particular, |Sppq| "
Thus the fact that S is decisive immediately follows from (18). Assume now that S is decisive. We need to show that, for every p P P, pϕ, ψ, idq P Stab U ppq implies ψ " id, and pϕ, ψ, ρ 0 q P Stab U ppq implies ψ " ψ˚for a suitable unique conjugate ψ˚of ρ 0 . Let p P P and pick q 0 P Sppq. If pϕ, ψ, idq P Stab U ppq, then we have ψq 0 " q 0 and thus, by cancellation, ψ " id. If pϕ, ψ, ρ 0 q P Stab U ppq, then we have ψq 0 ρ 0 " q 0 , which implies ψ " q 0 ρ 0 q´1 0 (recall that the linear order q 0 is identified with an element of S n ). Thus, ψ˚" q 0 ρ 0 q´1 0 works.
piiq In order to show that S is U -symmetric, we pick pϕ 1 , ψ 1 , ρ 1 q P U and see that Spp pϕ1,ψ1,ρ1" ψ 1 Sppqρ 1 . Recall that Stab U pp pϕ1,ψ1,ρ1" Stab U ppq pϕ1,ψ1,ρ1q . Thus, q P Spp pϕ1,ψ1,ρ1if and only if, for every pϕ, ψ, ρq P Stab U ppq, ψ 1 ψψ´1 1 qρ 1 ρρ´1 1 " q, which is equivalent to ψpψ´1 1 qρ 1 qρ " ψ´1 1 qρ 1 , that is, to ψ´1 1 qρ 1 P Sppq and thus to q P ψ 1 Sppqρ 1 .
piiiq This is just Lemma 4 in Bubboloni and Gori (2015) .
By the above proposition, any U -symmetric spf maps the profile p into an element of Sppq. The next result shows that, conversely, one can construct f P F˚U just fixing a system pp j q jPP U of representatives and assigning within Spp j q the value to be assumed on each p j . Its proof is formally equal to Proposition 5 in Bubboloni and Gori (2015) . A detailed proof of the above result is proposed in Appendix C.5.
Proposition 30. Let U ď G be regular and pp j q jPP U P SpU q. For every j P P U , let q j P Spp j q. Then there exists a unique f P F˚U such that, for every j P P U , f pp j q " q j .
Given now pp j q jPP U P SpU q, let Φ :ˆj PP U Spp j q Ñ F˚U be the function which associates with every pq j q jPP U Pˆj PP U Spp j q the unique f P F˚U defined in Proposition 30. Of course, Φ depends on pp j q jPP U but we do not emphasize that dependence in the notation. Note that Φ is injective.
Theorem 31. Let U ď G be regular, pp j q jPP U P SpU q and C P C˚U . Then
Proof. We first prove that Φ`ˆj PP U Spp j q X Cpp j q˘Ď F˚U C . Let pq j q jPP U Pˆj PP U Spp j q X Cpp j q and f " Φ`pq j q jPP U˘. We show that f P F˚U C . We know that f P F˚U , so that have are left with showing that f P F C . Given p P P, there exist j P P U and pϕ, ψ, ρq P U such that p " p j pϕ,ψ,ρq . As we know that q j " f pp j q P Cpp j q, by U -symmetry of f and C, we have f ppq " f pp j pϕ,ψ,ρ" ψq j ρ P ψCpp j qρ " Cpp j pϕ,ψ,ρ" Cppq as desired. Let us next prove that F˚U C Ď Φ`ˆj PP U Spp j q X Cpp j q˘. Consider then f P F˚U C and note that, by Proposition 29(iii), for every j P P U , f pp j q P Spp j qXCpp j q. Then pf pp jjPP U Pˆj PP U Spp j qXCpp j q. Thus the function f and the function Φ`pf pp jjPP U˘are U -symmetric functions which coincide on a system of representatives. Hence, by Proposition 26, we obtain f " Φ`pf pp jjPP U˘. The last part of the statement is an immediate consequence of the fact that Φ is injective.
In order to write down the proof of Theorem 7 we need a final technical lemma.
Lemma 32. Let R P M˚U and p P P. Then, for every x, y P N and pϕ, ψ, ρ 0 q P Stab U ppq, px, yq P Rppq if and only if pψpyq, ψpxqq P Rppq.
Proof. Let x, y P N and pϕ, ψ, ρ 0 q P Stab U ppq. Then, by the U -symmetry of R, we have Rppq " Rpp pϕ,ψ,ρ0q " ψRppqρ 0 . On the other hand, x ľ Rppq y is equivalent to ψpyq ľ ψRppqρ0 ψpxq and thus to ψpyq ľ Rppq ψpxq.
Proof of Theorem 7. piq ñ piiq. The fact that C P C˚U admits a U -symmetric resolute refinement means that F˚U C ‰ ∅. Let then f P F˚U C and define the social method R : P Ñ RpN q, by Rppq " f ppqz∆ for all p P P, where ∆ " tpx, xq : x P N u. Note that ∆ is a relation on N and that for every ψ P S n and ρ P Ω, we have ψ∆ρ " ∆, accordingly to the definitions given in Section 2.2. We show that R is irreflexive, acyclic, U -symmetric and that C R refines C. Let p P P. Rppq is irreflexive by definition and surely acyclic since it refines the linear order f ppq. Let pϕ, ψ, ρq P U . Then, by the U -symmetry of f , we have Rpp pϕ,ψ,ρ" f pp pϕ,ψ,ρq qz∆ " pψf ppqρqzpψ∆ρq " ψpf ppqz∆qρ " ψRppqρ.
Thus R P M˚U . Finally, observe that C R ppq " tq P LpN q : Rppq Ď qu " tq P LpN q : f ppqz∆ Ď qu " tf ppqu Ď Cppq.
Thus C R refines C. piiq ñ piiiq Let R be an irreflexive, acyclic, U -symmetric social method such that C R refines C. Then, by Lemma 32, condition paq in (iii) is fulfilled.
piiiq ñ piq The proof is a remake of Bubboloni and Gori (2015, Section 8) , which is essentially obtained replacing the minimal majority relation R νppq ppq there, with the present relation Rppq.
A detailed proof of the implication piiiq ñ piq in Theorem 7 is proposed in Appendix C.4.
B.4 Analysis of F
The proof of the above result is similar to the one of Proposition 17 in Bubboloni and Gori (2016b) and can be found in Appendix C.6.
Let U ď S hˆSnˆt idu be regular, pp j q jPP U P SpU q and
hich associates with every px j q jPP U Pˆj PP U Cpp j q the unique f P F
Of course, Φ depends on U , pp j q jPP U and C but we do not emphasize that dependence in the notation. Note that we used the same letter Φ to treat both spfs and k-scfs. Note also that Φ is injective.
The proof of the above result is similar to the one of Theorem 18 in Bubboloni and Gori (2016b) and can be found in Appendix C.7.
B.5 Analysis of F
Recall that if p P P and y P Cppq, then y P LpN q (y P P k pN q). Moreover, given ψ P S n , meaning of the writing ψy is carefully explained in Section 2.2.
Fix pp j q jPP U P SpU q and pϕ˚, ψ˚, ρ 0 q P U . Define, for every j P P U 1 , the set
and, for every j P P U 2 , the set
where ψ j is the unique element in S n such that
Note that the uniqueness of ψ j is guaranteed by Lemma 16 (ii) in Bubboloni and Gori (2016) .
Recall that P U 1 and P U 2 cannot be both empty. Thus at least one of the above set is always defined. Of course, A 1 C and A 2 C depend also on U , pp j q jPP U and pϕ˚, ψ˚, ρ 0 q but we do not emphasize that dependence in the notation.
The proof of the next result is similar to Proposition 19 in Bubboloni and Gori (2016b) and can be found in Appendix C.8.
and f pp j pϕ˚,ψ˚,ρ0" z j for all j P P U 1 , and f pp j q " x j for all j P P U 2 . Let U ď G be regular such that U ď S hˆSnˆt idu, pp j q jPP U P SpU q, pϕ˚, ψ˚, ρ 0 q P U and
be the function which associates with every py j , z j q jPP U
Of course, Ψ 1 , Ψ 2 and Ψ 3 depend on U , pp j q jPP U , pϕ˚, ψ˚, ρ 0 q and C but we do not emphasize that dependence in the notation. Note also that Ψ 1 , Ψ 2 and Ψ 3 are injective.
then we have that:
• for every j P P
Proof. Let C P C U . Assume first that P U 1 and P U 2 are both nonempty. Consider f P F U C and note that´p f pp
Thus Ψ 3 is bijective and we have |F
1 " ∅ and the case P U 2 " ∅ are similar and then omitted.
Assume now that C is decisive. Assume, by contradiction, that there exists j P P U 1 such that A 1 C pp j q " ∅. Thus, for every y P Cpp j q and z P Cpp j pϕ˚,ψ˚,ρ0we have z " ψ˚y. Using decisiveness, fix z P Cpp j pϕ˚,ψ˚,ρ0q q. If y 1 , y 2 P Cpp j q, we then have z " ψ˚y 1 " ψ˚y 2 so that y 1 " y 2 . It follows that |Cpp j q| " 1 " |Cpp j pϕ˚,ψ˚,ρ0q q| and that Cpp j pϕ˚,ψ˚,ρ0" ψ˚Cpp j q, against U -consistency. The last part of the theorem is trivial.
Let now consider C P C U k . The theorem can be proved using formally the same argument.
B.6 Proof of Theorem 9
Proof of Theorem 9. Let first U ď S hˆSnˆt idu. Then, by Theorem 34, we have that F U C ‰ ∅. Let next U ę S hˆSnˆt idu. In order to show that also in this case we have F U C ‰ ∅, by Theorem 36, we need to prove that, for every j P P
Assume, by contradiction, that there exists j P P U 2 such that A 2 C pp j q " ∅ and consider ψ j P S n as defined in (19). Then, for every x P Cpp j q, we have ψ j x " x. Recall that ψ j is a conjugate of ρ 0 and thus, in particular, ψ j ‰ id. Since C is decisive, we can pick x P Cpp j q. Thus x P S n and, using the cancellation law in S n , we get the contradiction ψ j " id.
B.7 Proof of Theorem 10
Theorem 36, says that to guarantee the existence of a U -consistent resolute refinement for some
U we need to satisfy the condition A 2 C pp j q ‰ ∅ for every j P P U 2 , where pp j q jPP U P SpU q. We have seen in the proof of Theorem 9, that that condition always holds if C P C U . On the other hand, there is no reason for having it satisfied when C P C U k . Indeed, in that context, A 2 C pp j q " ∅, for some j P P U 2 , means that for ψ j P S n defined by(19) we have
In other words, ψ j fixes all the k-subsets of N appearing in Cpp j q. Thus the elements of Cpp j q need to be union of ψ j -orbits and this does not constitute, in principle, a contradictory fact.
The situation is then more variegated with respect to the case of the spcs and, in order to manage it, we need some preliminary work. The next lemma is an easy but very useful starting point.
Lemma 37. Let U ď G be regular such that U ď S hˆSnˆt idu, pp j q jPP U P SpU q and
Proof. Let Cpp j q " tx 1 u where x 1 is a k-subset of N and assume, by contradiction, that A 2 C pp j q " ∅. Thus, by (20), we have ψ j x 1 " x 1 , with ψ j P S n defined in (19). Since j P P U 2 , there exists pϕ 1 , ψ 1 , ρ 0 q P Stab U pp j q and, by the regularity of U , we have ψ 1 " ψ j . Thus ψ 1 x 1 " x 1 . It follows that ψ´1 1 Cpp j q " Cpp j q. On the other hand, since U ď S hˆSnˆt idu, there exists pϕ˚, ψ˚, ρ 0 q P U and, by (15) and (6), we deduce that Cpp j pϕ˚,ψ˚,ρ0" C´pp j pϕ1,ψ1,ρ0pϕ˚ϕ´1 1 ,ψ˚ψ´1 1 ,idq"
which contradicts (7).
Proof of the implication piiq ñ piq of Theorem 10. Assume that one among paq-pdq holds and let C P C U k be decisive. We will prove that F U k,C ‰ ∅. If paq holds then, by (17), we have P U 2 " ∅. Hence, by Theorem 36, we immediately deduce F U k,C ‰ ∅. Assume then that paq does not hold but one among pbq-pdq holds. Then, using the other implication in (17), we have P U 2 ‰ ∅ and, by Theorem 36, we need to show that, for every j P P U 2 , A 2 C pp j q ‰ ∅. Assume by contradiction that for some j P P U 2 , we have A 2 C pp j q " ∅. Thus (20) holds true, for ψ j P S n defined by (19) . Recall now that ψ j is a conjugate of ρ 0 . Thus if n is even all its orbits have size 2; if n is odd we have a unique orbit of size 1 given by the only fixed point of ψ j and all the other orbits have size 2.
Assume first that k " 1. Then, for every x P Cpp j q, x is a singleton and the unique element in x is a fixed point for ψ j . Since, for n even, ψ j has no fixed point we deduce that n is odd and Cpp j q " ttx 1 uu where x 1 is the only fixed point of ψ j . Thus, by Lemma 37, we get the contradiction A 2 C pp j q ‰ ∅. Assume now that n ď 3. Because of the previous step we need to consider only the case n " 3 and k " 2. Thus, every x P Cpp j q is a 2-subset of N fixed by ψ j . But T ψj " r1, 2s, that is, ψ j " pa bq for some distinct a, b P N . Thus the only possibility is x " ta, bu and hence Cpp j q " tta, buu is a singleton. Again Lemma 37 gives the internal contradiction A 2 C pp j q ‰ ∅. Assume next that n is even and k is odd. Every x P Cpp j q is a k-subset of N fixed by ψ j . But since every orbit of ψ j has size 2, any subset of N fixed by ψ j has even size. Thus Cpp j q " ∅ against decisiveness.
Finally assume that k " n´1. If n is even, then k is odd and we conclude by the previous step. If n is odd, we have that every x P Cpp j q is a pn´1q-subset of N fixed by ψ j . But the unique subset of N of size n´1 fixed by ψ j is the union of the orbits of ψ j of size 2, that is N ztx 1 u, where x 1 is the unique fixed point of ψ j . Thus, |Cpp j q| " 1 and Lemma 37 gives the contradiction A 2 C pp j q ‰ ∅.
We are now left with proving the implication piq ñ piiq of Theorem 10. To that purpose, we need to introduce and study a special family of k-sccs.
Let U ď G be regular. For every p P P, denote by ψ p the unique permutation in S n such that
The k-scc U k associated with U is defined, for every p P P, by
The next two propositions show some important properties of U k .
Proposition 38. Let U ď G be regular. The following facts are equivalent:
(ii) One of the following condition is satisfied:
(c) n is even with n ě 4 and k is even.
Proof. piq ñ piiq Let U k be decisive, P U 2 ‰ ∅ and n even. We show that n ě 4 and that k is even. Since P U 2 ‰ ∅, there exists p P P such that Stab U ppq ę S hˆt iduˆtidu and thus there exists pϕ, ψ p , ρ 0 q P Stab U ppq. By U k ppq ‰ ∅, we deduce that there exists at least one k-subset x of N fixed by ψ p . Since 1 ď k ď n´1, x is a proper nonempty subset of N which is union of ψ p -orbits. Since n is even, we have n{2 orbits all of size 2. If n " 2, then we have just one orbit and thus the only subsets of N which are union of orbits are ∅ and N . It follows that n ě 4 and that k " |x| is even.
piiq ñ piq Let Q " tp P P : Stab U ppq ę S hˆt iduˆtiduu. Since P k pN q ‰ ∅, in order to show that U k is decisive, it is enough to see that for every p P Q, we have tx P P k pN q : ψ p x " xu ‰ ∅. If P U 2 " ∅, this is clear because necessarily we also have Q " ∅. Let n be odd and pick p P Q. Then ψ p has n´1 2 ě 1 orbits of size 2 and one orbit of size 1. Assembling some of those orbits we can surely build a k-subset of N fixed by ψ p , whatever k is. Thus tx P P k pN q : ψ p x " xu ‰ ∅. Let finally n be even with n ě 4 and k be even. Then we have 2 ď k ď n´2. Pick p P Q. Then ψ p has n 2 ě 2 orbits of size 2. Assembling some of those orbits we can surely build a k-subset of N fixed by ψ p . Thus, tx P P k pN q : ψ p x " xu ‰ ∅.
In order to state the next result, let us first define the set
Proposition 39. Let U ď G be regular. Then the following facts hold:
(i) If pϕ, ψ, ρq P U and p P P, then U k pp pϕ,ψ,ρ" ψU k ppq.
(ii) If pn, kq R T then, for every p P P, |U k ppq| ě 2. In particular U k is decisive.
piq Let first p be such that Stab U ppq ď S hˆt iduˆtidu. Then also Stab U pp pϕ,ψ,ρď S hˆt iduˆtidu and thus U k pp pϕ,ψ,ρ" U k ppq " P k pN q " ψP k pN q " ψU k ppq. Let next p be such that Stab U ppq ę S hˆt iduˆtidu. Then also Stab U pp pϕ,ψ,ρę S hˆt iduˆtidu. We find the link between ψ p and ψ p pϕ,ψ,ρq . Let pϕ 1 , ψ p , ρ 0 q P Stab U ppq. Then, using the fact that Ω is abelian, we have
Thus, ψ p pϕ,ψ,ρq " pψ p q ψ . Using P k pN q " ψP k pN q and (14), it follows that U k pp pϕ,ψ,ρ" tx P P k pN q : ψ p pϕ,ψ,ρq x " xu " tψx P P k pN q : x P P k pN q, ψψ p ψ´1ψ x " ψxu " tψx P P k pN q : x P P k pN q, ψ p x " xu " ψU k ppq.
piiq Let pn, kq R T . Then we have k R t1, n´1u and n ě 4. Moreover, n is odd or n is even and k is even. Thus, by Lemma 38, U k is decisive. Fix now p P P. We show that |U k ppq| ě 2. If U k ppq " P k pN q, we have |U k ppq| "`n k˘ě n ě 2. If instead U k ppq " tx P P k pN q : ψ p x " xu, then U k ppq is made up by all the k-subsets of N which can be formed as union of ψ p -orbits. Since |U k ppq| ě 1 we have at least one of them, say x 1 P U k ppq. Let first n be odd. Then n ě 5 and there are n´1 2 ě 2 orbits of ψ p of size 2 and one orbit of size 1. Since k ě 2, there is at least one orbit of size 2 included in x 1 . On the other hand, not all the orbits of size 2 are included in x 1 , otherwise k " |x 1 | " n´1. Now exchange one orbit of size 2 included in x 1 with one orbit of size 2 left out. This builds another k-subset x 2 of N belonging to U k ppq. Let next n be even and k be even. Here n ě 4 and we have n 2 ě 2 orbits of ψ p all of size 2. Obviously we have used at least one orbit to build x 1 but not all and we can exchange one orbit included in x 1 with one left out building another k-subset x 2 of N belonging to U k ppq.
piiiq By (i) we have that condition (6) for U -consistency is satisfied; by (ii) we also have that, trivially, condition (7) for U -consistency is satisfied because it is never the case to have U k ppq a singleton for any p P P.
Proof of the implication piq ñ piiq of Theorem 10. By (17), we get the desired result proving that if P U 2 ‰ ∅ and pn, kq R T , then F U k,U k " ∅. Indeed, assume that P U 2 ‰ ∅ and pn, kq R T and consider U k . By Proposition 39, we have that U k P C U k . Consider pp j q jPP U P SpU q and pick j P P U 2 so that Stab U pp j q ę S hˆt iduˆtidu. Then, by definition of U k , we have U k pp j q " tx P P k pN q : ψ p j x " xu " tx P P k pN q : ψ j x " xu.
Therefore we surely have that, for every x P U k ppq, ψ j x " x and (20) is satisfied, so that A 2 U k pp j q " ∅ and, by Theorem 36, F U k,U k " ∅.
C Some technical proofs
We collect here the detailed proofs of some results which are adaptations of other results recently published by the two authors.
C.1 Proof of Proposition 3
Let us prove first that C U1 X C U2 " C xU1,U2y . Since xU 1 , U 2 y ď G contains both U 1 and U 2 , we immediately get C xU1,U2y Ď C U1 X C U2 . Let us now fix C P C U1 X C U2 and prove C P C xU1,U2y . Define, for every t P N, the set xU 1 , U 2 y t of the elements in xU 1 , U 2 y that can be written as product of t elements of U 1 Y U 2 . Then we have xU 1 , U 2 y " Ť tPN xU 1 , U 2 y t and to get C P C xU1,U2y it is enough to show the two following facts:
(a) for every t P N, for every p P P and g " pϕ, ψ, idq P xU 1 , U 2 y t , (6) holds true;
(b) for every t P N, p P P and g " pϕ, ψ, ρ 0 q P xU 1 , U 2 y t , (7) holds true.
For every g " pϕ, ψ, ρq P G, define g " pϕ, ψ, idq P G. We start showing that, for every t P N,
If ρ " id, there is nothing to prove. So assume ρ " ρ 0 . Since, for every i P t1, 2u, we have that U i " Z iˆRi with Z i ď S hˆSh and R i ď Ω, then (23) surely holds for t " 1. If t ě 2, pick g " g 1¨¨¨gt " pϕ, ψ, ρ 0 q P xU 1 , U 2 y t , where g 1 , . . . , g t P U 1 Y U 2 . Since ρ 0 has order two, the number of j P t1, . . . , tu such that the third component of g j is ρ 0 is odd. Pick j P t1, . . . , tu such that g j " pϕ j , ψ j , ρ 0 q. By the case t " 1, we have that g j " pϕ j , ψ j , idq P U 1 Y U 2 , so that g " g 1 . . . g j´1 g j g j`1 . . . g t P xU 1 , U 2 y t and its first and second components are equal to those of g. Moreover, the number of factors in g having as third component ρ 0 is even, which gives g " pϕ, ψ, idq. We now show (a), by induction on t. If t " 1, we have g P xU 1 , U 2 y 1 " U 1 Y U 2 and so (22) is guaranteed by C P C U1 X C U2 . Assume (22) up to some t P N and show that it holds also for t`1. Let p P P and g " pϕ, ψ, idq P xU 1 , U 2 y t`1 . Then there exist g˚" pϕ˚, ψ˚, ρ˚q P xU 1 , U 2 y t and g 1 " pϕ 1 , ψ 1 , ρ 1 q P U 1 Y U 2 such that g " g 1 g˚" pϕ 1 ϕ˚, ψ 1 ψ˚, ρ 1 ρ˚q. We want to show that Cpp g q " ψ 1 ψ˚Cppq. Note that g " g 1 g˚and that, by (23), g˚P xU 1 , U 2 y t and g 1 P U 1 Y U 2 . Then, using (15) and applying the inductive hypothesis for (22) both to g 1 and to g˚, we get Cpp g q " Cpp g 1 g˚q " Cppp g˚qg 1 q " ψ 1 Cpp g˚q " ψ 1 ψ˚Cppq. We next show (b). Let t P N, p P P, g " pϕ, ψ, ρ 0 q P xU 1 , U 2 y t and |Cppq| " 1. We need to show that Cpp g q ‰ ψCppq. First of all note that, since xU 1 , U 2 y contains an element with third component ρ 0 , then we necessarily have R 1 " Ω or R 2 " Ω, so that pid, id, ρ 0 q P U 1 Y U 2 . Moreover, we can express g as g " g pid, id, ρ 0 q and, by (23), g P xU 1 , U 2 y t . Thus, by (15) and (a), we have Cpp g q " Cppp pid,id,ρ0g q " ψCpp pid,id,ρ0q q. On the other hand, since pid, id, ρ 0 q P U 1 Y U 2 and C P C U1 X C U2 , we get Cpp pid,id,ρ0‰ Cppq and so, by (14), Cpp g q " ψCpp pid,id,ρ0‰ ψCppq as required.
The proof of the equality
is formally the same.
C.2 Proof of Proposition 27
Let p P P and show that Cppq " C 1 ppq. We know there exist j P P U and pϕ, ψ, idq P U such that p " p j pϕ,ψ,idq . Then,
C.3 Proof of Proposition 28
Let p P P and show that Cppq " C 1 ppq. Let j P P U be the unique orbit such that p P j. If there exists pϕ, ψ, idq P U such that p " p j pϕ,ψ,idq , then we get Cppq " C 1 ppq operating as in (24). So, assume that, for every pϕ, ψ, ρq P U such that p " p j pϕ,ψ,ρq , we have ρ " ρ 0 .
We show that (25) implies Stab U pp j q ď S hˆSnˆt idu. Indeed, suppose by contradiction that there exists pϕ 1 , ψ 1 , ρ 0 q P Stab U pp j q. Pick pϕ, ψ, ρ 0 q P U such that p " p j pϕ,ψ,ρ0q and note that, by (15),
which contradicts (25). As a consequence, j P P U 1 and thus, by assumption, Cpp j pϕ˚,ψ˚,ρ0" C 1 pp j pϕ˚,ψ˚,ρ0q q. Pick again pϕ, ψ, ρ 0 q P U such that p " p j pϕ,ψ,ρ0q and note that, by (15), p " p j pϕ,ψ,ρ0q " pp j pϕ˚,ψ˚,ρ0pϕϕ´1 ,ψψ´1 ,idq so that, since C and C 1 are U -consistent, we finally obtain
C.4 Proof of piiiq ñ piq in Theorem 7
piiiq ñ piq By Theorem 31, in order to prove that that F˚U C ‰ ∅, it is sufficient to show that, for every p P P, Sppq X Cppq ‰ ∅. By Lemma 29 piq, since U is regular, for every p P P, we have Sppq ‰ ∅. Now, for every p P P such that Stab U ppq ď S hˆt iduˆtidu, we have Sppq " LpN q so that trivially Sppq X Cppq ‰ ∅. Thus, we are left with proving that, for every p P P such that Stab U ppq ď S hˆt iduˆtidu, we have Sppq X Cppq ‰ ∅.
From now till the end of the section, let us fix p P P and pϕ, ψ, ρ 0 q P Stab U ppq. Recall that U is regular; ψ is a conjugate of ρ 0 ; Rppq is irreflexive, acyclic such that tq P LpN q : Rppq Ď qu Ď Cppq and condition paq is satisfied. We have to prove that Sppq X Cppq ‰ ∅.
We are going to exhibit an element of the set Sppq X Cppq, namely the linear order q defined in (30). The construction of q is quite tricky and relies on some preliminary lemmas concerning the properties of the relation Rppq and of its transitive extension R˚ppq defined in (27). Thus, the first part of the proof is devoted to the study of such relations.
Since ψ is a conjugate of ρ 0 , we have that ψ has the same type of ρ 0 and, in particular, |ψ| " 2. Let px j q r j"1 P N r be a system of representatives of the ψ-orbits. Thus r is the number of ψ-orbits and we have Opψq " ttx j , ψpx j qu : j P vrwu .
Note that if n is even, then r " n 2 ; ψ has no fixed point; |tx j , ψpx j qu| " 2 for all j P vrw. If instead n is odd, then r " n`1 2 ; ψ has a unique fixed point, sayx r ; |tx j , ψpx j qu| " 2 for all j P vr´1w. Rppq acyclic implies Rppq asymmetric. Thus, x ľ Rppq y is equivalent to x ą Rppq y and implies x ‰ y. We will write, for compactness, x ą y instead of x ą Rppq y. Then, for every x, y P N , we translate condition paq into x ą y ô ψpyq ą ψpxq.
Given x, y P N with x ‰ y, a chain γ for Rppq (or a Rppq-chain) from x to y is an ordered sequence x 1 , . . . , x l , with l ě 2, of distinct elements of N such that x 1 " x, x l " y, and, for every j P vl´1w, px j , x j`1 q P Rppq. The number l´1 is called the length of the chain, x its starting point and y its end point. Consider now the following relation on N ,
R˚ppq " tpx, yq P N 2 : there exists a Rppq-chain from x to yu,
and note that R˚ppq Ě Rppq.
Lemma 40. R˚ppq is asymmetric and transitive. Moreover, for every x, y P N , px, yq P R˚ppq if and only if pψpyq, ψpxqq P R˚ppq.
Proof. Let us prove first that R˚ppq is asymmetric. Let px, yq P R˚ppq. Then, there exists a Rppqchain from x to y, that is, there exist l ě 2 distinct x 1 , . . . , x l P N such that x " x 1 , y " x l and, for every j P vl´1w, x j ą x j`1 . Assume, by contradiction, that py, xq P R˚ppq. Then there exist m ě 2 distinct y 1 , . . . , y m P N such that y " y 1 , x " y m and, for every j P vm´1w, y j ą y j`1 . Consider now the set A " tj P t2, . . . , mu : y j P tx 1 , . . . , x l´1 uu. Clearly, because y m " x 1 , we have m P A ‰ ∅. Let us define then m˚" min A, so that there exists l˚P vl´1w such that y m˚" x l˚.
Then it is easy to check that x l˚, x l˚`1 , . . . , x l , y 2 , . . . , y m˚i s a sequence of at least three elements in N , with no repetition up to the x l˚" y m˚, which is a cycle in Rppq and the contradiction is found. Let us prove now that R˚ppq is transitive. Let px, yq, py, zq P R˚ppq. Then, by the definition of R˚ppq, there exist l ě 2 distinct x 1 , . . . , x l P N such that x " x 1 , y " x l and, for every j P vl´1w, x j ą x j`1 ; moreover, there are m ě 2 distinct y 1 , . . . , y m P N such that y " y 1 , z " y m and, for every j P vm´1w, y j ą y j`1 . Consider then the sequence γ of alternatives x 1 , . . . , x l , y 2 , . . . , y m . We show that those alternatives are all distinct. Assume that there exist i P vlw and j P vmw with x i " y j . Then we have a Rppq-chain with starting point x i and end point y as well as a Rppq-chain with starting point y and end point y j " x i , that is, px i , yq P R˚ppq and py, x i q P R˚ppq, against the asymmetry. It follows that γ is a chain from x to z, so that px, zq P R˚ppq.
We are left with proving that px, yq P R˚ppq if and only if pψpyq, ψpxqq P R˚ppq. Let px, yq P R˚ppq and consider l ě 2 distinct x 1 , . . . , x l P N such that x " x 1 , y " x l and, for every j P vl´1w, x j ą x j`1 . Defining, for every j P vlw, y j " ψpx l´j`1 q and using (26), it is immediately checked that ψpyq " y 1 , ψpxq " y l and that, for every j P vl´1w, y j ą y j`1 . In other words, we have a R˚ppq-chain from ψpyq to ψpxq, that is, pψpyq, ψpxqq P R˚ppq. The other implication is now a trivial consequence of |ψ| " 2.
In what follows, we write x ãÑ y instead of px, yq P R˚ppq and x ãÑ y instead of px, yq R R˚ppq. As consequence of Lemma 40, for every x, y, z P N , the following relations hold true: x ãÑ x; x ãÑ y implies y ãÑ x; x ãÑ y and y ãÑ z imply x ãÑ z; x ãÑ y is equivalent to ψpyq ãÑ ψpxq.
Of course, for every j P vrwzJ, we have tx j , ψpx j qu X Γ " ∅. Note also that, when n is even, we have J Y J˚" vrw; if n is odd, by Lemma 42 piiq, we have J Y J˚" vr´1w. For every j P J, let us call y j the unique element in the set tx j , ψpx j qu X Γ so that Γ " ty j : j P Ju.
Consider now the subset of N defined by T " ty j : j P Ju Y Ť jPJ˚tx j , ψpx j qu and note that T Ě Γ. Let l P Θpp, T q and for j P J˚, let y j be the maximum of tx j , ψpx j qu with respect to l, so that y j ą l ψpy j q. Define M " ty j : j P J Y J˚u.
Observe that if n is even, then M Y ψpM q " N ; if n is odd, then M Y ψpM q " N ztx r u. Moreover, we have |M | " t n 2 u, M X ψpM q " ∅ and Γ Ď M Ď T . The restriction of l P Θpp, T q to M is a linear order g P Θpp, M q. We can assume that a 1 ą g . . . ą g a t n 2 u where M " ta 1 , . . . , a t n 2 u u. Finally, consider the linear order q on N such that a 1 ą q . . . ą q a t n 2 u ą q ψ`a t n 2 u˘ąq . . . ą q ψpa 1 q if n is even a 1 ą q . . . ą q a t n 2 u ą qxr ą q ψ`a t n 2 u˘ąq . . . ą q ψpa 1 q if n is odd,
and prove that q P Sppq X Cppq. Note that in the upper part of q there are the alternatives in M and in the lower one those in ψpM q; in the odd case, the fixed pointx r of ψ is ranked in the middle, at the position r " n`1
2 . By construction, we have that ψqρ 0 " q, which implies, due to the regularity of U , that q P Sppq. As a consequence, we have that, for every x, y P N , y ą q x if and only if ψpxq ą q ψpyq,
because, since ψ 2 " id, y ą q x ô y ą ψqρ0 x ô ψ 2 pxq ą ψq ψ 2 pyq ô ψpxq ą q ψpyq.
In order to complete the proof we need to show that q P Cppq. Since we know that Θpp, N q Ď Cppq, we proceed showing that q P Θpp, N q. We need to prove that Rppq Ď q, that is, that for every x, y P N , x ą y implies x ą q y. Since when n is even we have N " M Y ψpM q and when n is odd we have N " M Y ψpM q Y tx r u, we reduce to prove that, for every x, y P M : (a) x ą y implies x ą q y; (b) x ą ψpyq implies x ą q ψpyq; (c) ψpxq ą ψpyq implies ψpxq ą q ψpyq; (d) ψpxq ą y implies ψpxq ą q y, and, in the odd case, showing further that, for every x P M : (e) x ąx r implies x ą qxr ; (f)x r ą x impliesx r ą q x; (g) ψpxq ąx r implies ψpxq ą qxr ; (h)x r ą ψpxq impliesx r ą q ψpxq.
-If j P P U 1 and ρ 1 " id, then f ppq " ψ 1 y j . By (15), if ρ " id, then f pp pϕ,ψ,ρ" f pp j pϕϕ1,ψψ1,id" ψψ 1 y j " ψf ppq, while if ρ " ρ 0 , then f pp pϕ,ψ,ρ" f pp j pϕϕ1,ψψ1,ρ0" ψψ 1 ψ´1 z j ‰ ψψ 1 y j " ψf ppq, since z j ‰ ψ˚y j because py j , z j q P A 1 C pp j q.
-If j P P U 1 and ρ 1 " ρ 0 , then f ppq " ψ 1 ψ´1 z j . By (15), if ρ " id, then f pp pϕ,ψ,ρ" f pp j pϕϕ1,ψψ1,ρ0" ψψ 1 ψ´1 z j " ψf ppq, while if ρ " ρ 0 , then f pp pϕ,ψ,ρ" f pp j pϕϕ1,ψψ1,id" ψψ 1 y j ‰ ψψ 1 ψ´1 z j " ψf ppq, since z j ‰ ψ˚y j because py j , z j q P A 1 C pp j q.
-If j P P U 2 , then f ppq " ψ 1 σ j ρ 1 σ´1 j x j and, by (15), f pp pϕ,ψ,ρ" f pp j pϕϕ1,ψψ1,ρρ1" ψψ 1 σ j ρρ 1 σ´1 j x j .
As a consequence, if ρ " id, we get f pp pϕ,ψ,ρ" ψf ppq. If instead ρ " ρ 0 , we have that f pp pϕ,ψ,ρ‰ ψf ppq if and only if ψψ 1 σ j ρ 0 ρ 1 σ´1 j x j ‰ ψψ 1 σ j ρ 1 σ´1 j x j if and only if σ j ρ 0 σ´1 j x j ‰ x j . However, the last relation holds true since σ j ρ 0 σ´1 j " ψ j and ψ j x j ‰ x j because x j P A 2 C pp j q.
Let us next prove that f P F C . Consider p P P and show that f ppq P Cppq. Let p " p j pϕ1,ψ1,ρ1q
for suitable j P P U and pϕ 1 , ψ 1 , ρ 1 q P U .
-If j P P U 1 and ρ 1 " id, then f ppq " ψ 1 y j and, by the U -consistency of C, ψ 1 y j P ψ 1 Cpp j q " Cpp j pϕ1,ψ1,id" Cppq.
-If j P P U 1 and ρ 1 " ρ 0 , then f ppq " ψ 1 ψ´1 z j and, by (15) and the U -consistency of C, ψ 1 ψ´1 z j P ψ 1 ψ´1 Cpp j pϕ˚,ψ˚,ρ0" C´pp j pϕ˚,ψ˚,ρ0pϕ1ϕ´1 ,ψ1ψ´1 ,idq¯" Cpp j pϕ1,ψ1,ρ0" Cppq.
-If j P P U 2 and ρ 1 " id, then f ppq " ψ 1 x j and, by the U -consistency of C, ψ 1 x j P ψ 1 Cpp j q " Cpp j pϕ1,ψ1,id" Cppq.
-If j P P U 2 and ρ 1 " ρ 0 , then let pϕ 2 , ψ 2 , ρ 0 q P U be such that p j pϕ2,ψ2,ρ0q " p j . By (15), we have p " p j pϕ1,ψ1,ρ0q " pp j pϕ2,ψ2,ρ0pϕ1ϕ´1 2 ,ψ1ψ´1 2 ,idq " p j pϕ1ϕ´1 2 ,ψ1ψ´1 2 ,idq .
Thus, f ppq " ψ 1 ψ´1 2 x j and, by the U -consistency of C, ψ 1 ψ´1 2 x j P ψ 1 ψ´1 2 Cpp j q " Cpp j pϕ1ϕ´1 2 ,ψ1ψ´1 2 ,id" Cppq.
Finally, in order to prove uniqueness, let f 1 P F U C such that f 1 pp j q " y j and f 1 pp j pϕ˚,ψ˚,ρ0" z j for all j P P U 1 , and f 1 pp j q " x j for all j P P U 2 . Then f, f 1 P C U realize f pp j q " f 1 pp j q for all j P P U and f pp j pϕ˚,ψ˚,ρ0" f 1 pp j pϕ˚,ψ˚,ρ0for all j P P U 1 . Hence, the thesis follows from Proposition 27.
Let now C P C U k . The proposition can be proved using the same argument.
